Litani, the Lebanese army is an overt supporter of the movement's right to "resist."
Again, according to the army's Web site, "the Lebanese Resistance against the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territories is a legal right which ends only with withdrawal of occupation."
And which parts of Lebanon are still occupied by Israel?
The Web site of the Lebanese Armed Forces considers that "the enemy is still located on the Shaba Farms, in places of great strategic and economic significance. Therefore, the Lebanese have the right to fight the enemy until it withdraws."
In practice, relations between the Lebanese army and Hizbullah have been less idyllic than this statement of shared intent might imply. Tensions, however, where they have arisen, have come more as a result of overlapping boundaries than out of a determination by the Lebanese army to fulfill Resolution 1701.
The most notable example was the shooting down by Hizbullah of an Lebanese army Gazelle helicopter which entered a Hizbullah "security zone" in August 2008, which killed the navigator.
The incident, which had no practical repercussions for Hizbullah, indicated the relative balance of power between the two fraternal forces. While each recognizes the rights of the other as a legitimate military force, the Lebanese army is encouraged not to stray too close to the activities of the "resistance."
The insertion into Resolution 1701 of a clause facilitating the entry of the Lebanese army into the area south of the Litani River after the 2006 war was presented by the Olmert government of the time as a major achievement.
The claim was not entirely baseless. The presence of the army in the south has led to at least a greater semblance of normality along the border. Some achievements have been recorded, in cooperation with UNIFIL - particularly in locating ordnance in rural areas.
But the explosion at Khirbat a-Silm, combined with the Lebanese army's ambiguous response, says it all regarding the failure to prevent, or to seriously attempt to prevent, Hizbullah's rearming south of the Litani.
The undertaking of this mission would go against the very nature of the Lebanese army. The Lebanese army's officer corps is 30 percent Shi'ite. The majority of its rank and file also belongs to this sect. It is thus a force neither willing nor able to take the necessary measures against the independent military structure maintained by Hizbullah on Lebanese soil.
Hizbullah's mishap should serve to remind Israeli policy-makers that the security of the residents of the North will be maintained only by effective deterrence, or failing that, effective countermeasures.
The Lebanese army, meanwhile, will busy itself challenging the true enemies of Lebanon - namely, the Zionist cows who covet the pure waters of the Kafr Shuba pond.