Commentary

Time to install a benevolent dictator in Iraq

By Isaac Yetiv

In ancient Rome, during difficult and dangerous times, the Senate appointed, for a designated period, a "dictator" with plenipotentiary powers to restore order and save the Republic. Closer to us in our modern era, the elected President of France, Rene Coty, facing a chaotic situation after the rebellion of four generals in Algeria in 1958, called
on General De Gaulle to return  to power and save the Republic "a second time."

Today, there is no more chaotic and fraughtwith-danger place than  Iraq which seems ripe for the emergence of a strong man. The question is , shall we wait for things to go from bad to worse and result ina viciously anti-American dictator (Senator Dianne Feinsteineven named Muqtada El-Sadr as a potentialcandidate because he commands the 60,000 men Mahdiarmy, more powerful and disciplined than the government's still-in- progress military), or shall we preempt that catastrophic eventuality by grooming a strong man of our liking,  who will put an end  to the massacre of innocents  and hold together the pieces of Iraq as, for example, Tito held Yugoslavia. We may hope that he will re-establish a semblance of democracy whenhis time is up and civil order restored,  as it happened in Turkey for example. But even if he tarries, Iraq will not be in worse shape than  Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Jordan, our "moderate allies."

This may seem as  a far-fetched and unrealistic proposition, veiled in the secrecy of CIA antics.Nothing of the sort. It may even  be done  with the tacitcooperation of the Iraqi  parliament and government  to ensure the security and safety of the people which they, and the Americans, were unable to provide. It may be too soon to implement such a proposition but never too soon to think about it and prepare for "Plan B" as a last resort if --I amtempted to say 'when'--exasperated by the mounting casualties, the Congress decides to cut off the fundsand bring the troops back home.

The Iraqi people , who are dying at a ghastly rate of 100 a day,  which probably will increasesubstantially to counter the effects of the planned "surge," have  been clamoring for a strong man whowill rule with an iron fist and stop the killing. For them, stability and civil order trump democracy. Today, after three elections, a constitution, three
governments, at a heavy cost in blood and treasure, and no light at the end of the tunnel, the generalconsensus among the American people is for "a graceful exit" BUT only after a stability of sorts could be achieved.

The Iraqi parliament is barely functioning, in constant search for a quorum to transact business.Absenteeism is endemic. Many of its members live abroad. Former PM Allawi lives in London; Adnan Pachachi, in Dubai. All absentees continue to draw their salaries ($120,000! Are we paying?). Already 1.9 million of vital middle-class people have left the country, followed by thousands every week. No military efforts by Americans, except a total war that requires half-a-million troops and thousands of casualties on
all sides for which America is not ready and willing, and no diplomatic schemes can vanquish the hatred and vengeance and fear and quest for power of the multitude of groups with their own armadas that the tribal system has engendered and which foreign countries ,especially Iran, have supported, trained, and financedfor their own benefit. No Iraqi will shed tears overthe "suspension" for a time of an almost non-existent, useless, and very expensive parliament.

The only plan in town, let us call it "Plan A" is the "surge" of 21,500, now augmented to 32,000, more troops which has already generated a virulent and vociferous opposition in Congress that culminated in a nonsensical non-binding resolution that "it is not in the national interest." The enemy is listening, laughing, and rubbing his hands in the expectation of the Great Satan's defeat, thanks to Allahu Akbar. I cannot comprehend this Congress’ irresponsible action which has no operational effect, just to embarrass an embattled president and weaken his hand in what he believes is the best way to
avoid a debacle whose consequences are horrible to contemplate: a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and other agents of terror in Iraq; a bloodbath of gigantic proportions; an elevation of fanatic and nuclear-armed Iran to the position of hegemon in the Gulf and the whole Middle-East; the crumbling of our "moderate Arab allies" who will scramble to make deals with the "winner" behind our backs just to survive;  the triumph of Hizballah in Lebanon and  of Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank, who, with the Iranian bomb, will put Israel in a very dangerous situation that might require a preemptive strike; the strangulation of oil supplies and their sky-rocketing price; the strengthening of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, and more than anything—absent in the
Vietnam debacle—the certainty of spectacular attacks on American soil.

Even if Congress doesn't believe in the success of the "surge," once the Commander-in-Chief has made his decision and began to implement it, the only acceptable position is to strengthen his hand or, alternatively, to cut off the funds , or even impeach
him, two prerogatives prescribed by the Constitution which are "binding." The Congress may also amend the Constitution and change our political system from
"presidential " to "parliamentary,” which will allow it to topple the Executive leader with a vote of no-confidence rather than get stuck for four years.

The "surge" plan contains the same flaw as the Iraq Study Group recommendations : they both rely on the good will , capacity, and loyalty of others. There is
no certainty it will work. But a new commander, General David Petraeus, with new rules of engagement and strong determination may reduce the violence substantially and allow for a political solution that will make our exit safe and honorable.  How can the
Senate Committee approve Petraeus unanimously and then oppose vehemently the "surge" which he  was promoted to carry out? Whether we believe or not, we must root for our side and support our troops rather than demoralize them . There is a danger that
the loud detractors of the plan will, consciously or subconsciously, root for its defeat in order to claim " I told you so!" And what if it succeeds? How would
they feel about it?

If we fail in this last attempt because of lack of cooperation, incapacity, or disloyalty of Al-Maliki government,  we should  resort  to Plan B without delay: a strong man — call him a "temporary benevolent despot" with plenipotentiary powers who will declare a state of emergency and/or martial law and, with a mixture of sticks and carrots,  disarm all militias, announce an equal distribution of oil money for all Iraqis, and a work
program that will employ the idle masses both in the army and civil life, coupled with  amnesty  and reconstruction programs. This will preempt the cutting of funds and, God forbid, the panicky flight we witnessed in Saigon in 1975.

In his bid for re-election, De Gaulle declared "Moi ou le chaos!" (Me or chaos). We may still face in Iraq the unenviable choice  of "lui" (he, the providential strong man) or Chaos. And   Chaos is not an option.